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Thesis 
Deregulating the natural gas industry in Georgia and else-
where has resulted in a "mixed bag" of beneficial and non-benefi-
cial outcomes for industry stakeholders. The approach to deregu-
lation has been varied and multifaceted; however, achieving the 
best overall outcome for the greatest number of stakeholders should 
not be the sole major objective. The American philosopher and 
psychologist William James argued best against the concept that the 
means in accomplishing an objective are more important than the 
end: "millions kept permanently happy" even though one single 
soul is left to "lead a life of lonely torture" is neither justified nor 
desirable (qtd. in Marcus 163). 
Introduction 
Prior to 1996, the source of natural gas was of no conse-
quence for many consumers, largely because gas was supplied by a 
monopoly. These consumers simply had no choice about where 
they could purchase gas. Prior to deregulation in Georgia, for 
example, the dominant suppliers of natural gas were United Cities 
Gas (serving primarily North Georgia) and Atlanta Gas Light 
Company (servicing the rest of the state). Natural gas was and still 
is delivered to industrial and domestic consumers through a series 
of pipelines owned by carriers such as Atlanta Gas Light (AGL). 
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The carriers purchase gas from suppliers such as Southern Natural 
Gas and receive the gas via pipelines at points called "city-gate." 
Deregulation has changed the industry, and most Georgia 
consumers can now choose from among a variety of suppliers of 
gas. However, because the pipelines are still owned by the same 
carriers, consumers continue to be dependent upon the same carri-
er system. Further, United Cities Gas did not choose to participate 
in the deregulatory process, and its customers will not have a 
choice of suppliers. Nonetheless, since 1996, the residential con-
sumption market for natural gas has been experiencing evolution-
ary changes. 1 
This paper will focus on the deregulation of natural gas in 
the state of Georgia, where the changes have been similar to those 
in other deregulated states across the nation. It will examine the 
effects of deregulation on the average consumer, make contrasts 
between the intentions of lawmakers and the realities of the dereg-
ulatory process, and point out the similarities between the effects of 
deregulation on the gas industry and other previously deregulated 
industries. The paper will also analyze issues concerning service 
and the cost of gas within the deregulation process and look close-
ly at shareholder and stakeholder interests in the industry. 
The intent of deregulation is to give the average consumer 
a choice among suppliers of gas. As more competitors enter the 
natural gas market, lower prices are expected to follow and justify 
a utilitarian argument that the market as a whole will benefit from 
lower prices. These arguments will be questioned in this paper. 
Background 
In 1996, U.S. residential and commercial natural gas users 
spent $45 billion on the fuel to heat and cool homes and offices, 
cook food, and provide power to a host of other household and 
business appliances. Prior to 1978, gas producers sold gas to inter-
state pipeline companies like Southern Natural Gas, which sold it 
in turn to local gas utilities, which then sold it to end users such as 
residential customers and small businesses. The prices at which 
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producers could sell their gas to interstate pipelines and at which 
interstate pipelines could sell their gas to local gas utilities were 
regulated by the federal government (GAO Report). With the 
Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Congress ended federal control 
over the price of gas at the well-head. This legislation also set in 
motion a series of public policy changes resulting in programs 
allowing residential and small commercial natural gas users to 
choose their suppliers. Under these programs, homes and small 
businesses can choose a supplier of natural gas, much as they can 
choose their long-distance telephone provider. Under a customer 
choice program, non-utility gas suppliers, called marketers, pur-
chase gas and arrange for its transportation to the local gas utility. 
Local gas utilities (now known as carriers), while no longer pur-
chasing gas directly for their customers, continue to deliver it to 
homes and businesses (GAO Report) . According to the rules of 
deregulation in Georgia, customers of Atlanta Gas Light Company 
had to choose a marketer by August 11, 1999, or be assigned a mar-
keter by the regulatory authority. Among these marketers in 
Georgia are Duke Energy, Georgia Natural Gas Services, and 
Peachtree Natural Gas. The assignments made by the regulatory 
authority were to be based upon each marketer's market share-the 
number of customers each marketer served during a particular 
operating period (Higgins). 
Proponents of these customer choice programs believe that 
customer choice will lead to more competition, lower gas prices, 
and greater service options for consumers. Others observers, how-
ever, are concerned about the reliability of service and the possible 
market power of gas suppliers if gas utilities are no longer respon-
sible for purchasing gas on behalf of their customers. Thus, ethical 
concerns associated with the deregulatory process inevitably have 
appeared as changes have taken place in this vital industry. 
Intent of Lawmakers and Reality 
In 1997 the Georgia Senate, through Senate Bill 215 (S.B. 
215), set forth the guidelines by which the natural gas industry 
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would be deregulated in Georgia. Some of the provisions of this 
bill indicate that 1) deregulation is designed to and is likely to pro-
duce lower prices for consumers of natural gas in Georgia, 2) 
deregulation will provide incentives for the gas company to lower 
its costs and rates, 3) deregulation will provide incentives to 
improve the efficiency and productivity of the gas company, and 4) 
deregulation will foster the long-term provision of natural gas serv-
ice in a manner that will improve the quality and choices of service 
(Senate Bill 215). In addition, the bill allows for the recovery of 
certain "stranded costs" by the utility (carrier), which force a dis-
junction between the legislative intent and the reality of deregula-
tion. In general, stranded costs are any investment that will be less 
valuable under competition than under regulation. They are of con-
cern in this case because the gas utility-the carrier-has a fair 
amount of stranded costs in the investment in pipelines delivering 
gas to the end users. Because the carriers will be compensated for 
the transportation of the gas and not receive any compensation for 
marketing the gas, they believe that some form of cost recovery for 
sunk or stranded costs must be passed along to the end user. 
Consequently, the hope for "lower prices for gas" has not come to 
fruition. 
In Georgia, AGL has been expressing a need to recover its 
investment, so these costs are being passed along to the end user in 
the form of monthly minimums for gas service. Many consumers 
are paying in the range of $24 to $40 each month, just to have gas 
service. The monthly minimum does not include any charges for 
the gas actually used each month. Although S.B. 215 did "provide 
for a straight fixed variable rate design, the recovery of certain 
stranded costs, and the use of alternative forms of rate regulation," 
mean that many consumers of natural gas (especially the elderly 
and those with limited income) are paying a premium to stay warm 
and have energy service because of the burden of stranded-cost 
recovery. 
The intent of deregulation was to allow competitive market 
forces to work, which would in tum lower energy costs. These 
forces are working within the marketers' framework; however, 
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because consumers are dependent upon carriers such as AGL, the 
competitive forces are not alleviating what has become a fixed cost. 
Therefore, for the average consumer in Georgia no reduction in 
overall prices has resulted. 
The Effects of Deregulation upon the Average Consumer 
The intent of natural gas deregulation is admirable and just 
and has resulted in lower prices for the gas itself; however, dereg-
ulation has been associated with greater price uncertainty. Prior to 
deregulation, the long-term contracts for most utilities prevented 
much variability in price. Utilities purchased gas at set prices that 
stabilized consumer prices and shielded end-users from spot mar-
ket increases. With deregulation, gas utilities began purchasing gas 
on the spot market because of cash flow problems and fragmented 
market environments, and the result was price volatility. In today's 
deregulated environment, there are no long-term contracts, and cus-
tomers may actually be paying substantially more for gas on a 
monthly basis. In the past, gas utilities contracted with interstate or 
intrastate pipeline companies for gas and transportation services for 
delivery of the gas to the city gate. 
"Firm capacity" gas (gas used for non-industrial essentials 
such as home heating) was contracted long-term by local utilities to 
insure gas availability for peak periods of use. Utilities wanted to 
insure that consumers had gas "on the coldest days of the year, 
regardless of additional demands placed on the gas delivery sys-
tem" (GAO Report). Because marketers must now contract for gas 
externally and have the gas placed in their carriers' distribution sys- · 
tern, some observers question the reliability of this procedure. 
However, since these programs are less than three years old, 
they have yet to be tested. Nonetheless, consumers are dependent 
upon a system in which the short-term purchase of gas in low vol-
umes by individual marketers results in problems with reliability. 
Nevertheless, the largest ethical issue for the industry at the 
present time concerns the recovery of stranded costs. Because this 
recovery seems to be the impetus for charging consumers substan-
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tial monthly minimums, a further analysis of the issue seems war-
ranted. Many have argued that there is no economic necessity for 
recovering stranded costs. The financial failure of some utilities · 
(carriers) as the result of deregulation without stranded cost recov-
ery will have no impact on production. Production is a cash flow 
question, not an equity/debt ownership issue. However, the cash 
flow problems of some carriers could impact delivery in the short 
term. While competition will reduce the price differences resulting 
from demand considerations, it is likely to contribute to cost-based 
differentials. 
The negative effects of stranded cost recovery on the aver-
age consumer are largely unwarranted. Distribution systems . 
owned by the carriers have been fully depreciated, and though they 
are worth essentially nothing to stockholders in a regulated envi-
ronment, one wonders why they are in tum worth substantial 
amounts in competition. Also, the operating costs of the carriers 
are below the price of output. Nevertheless, carriers feel that the 
value of their infrastructure (pipelines) should be realized. In 
Georgia, S.B. 215 has allowed for some recovery of stranded costs, 
but ethical issues arise as to the amount customers are being 
charged for stranded costs. In short, carriers of natural gas are 
being compensated for the use of their pipelines by marketers who 
in tum pass the cost along to the end user of the product. A more 
equitable recovery of costs could be found in usage charges. 
Specifically, charging a certain amount per thermal unit of gas to 
defray the cost of the pipeline would be less burdensome than the 
present process. Charging a large minimum per month, whether or 
not the consumer uses any gas, is both burdensome to the consumer 
and largely unwarranted. 
Service and Product Cost Parameters 
In the race to deregulate the natural gas industry, product 
cost seems to be the dominant issue; however, service and other 
considerations need to be addressed on behalf of the end user. 
Consumers are not buying gas, per se, but are buying warmth, hot 
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water, and a method by which to prepare food. In Georgia, the car-
rier AGL has accepted the responsibility of providing service 
(appliance repair, etc.) for the customers who purchase gas from 
marketers using AGL pipelines. However, in many instances, con-
sumers are not receiving service on a timely or affordable basis, 
and some repairs, excluding parts, can cost as much as 30% of the 
average price of a new appliance. This finding brings into question 
the future reliability and affordability of natural gas service. 
Without a properly functioning gas appliance, the gas itself is of no 
practical use, so marketers may have to provide things like afford-
able repair service: "In the market of the near future, there will be 
more competition but fewer competitors. More and more, cus-
tomers are going to demand that energy marketers do more than 
deliver energy. They are going to demand that marketers create 
some kind of value that the customer could not get otherwise" (Toal 
2). Value for the consumer essentially means having both a reliable 
source of energy at a competitive price and appliances that can be 
repaired when needed. 
Many have argued that deregulation has saved or will save 
natural gas customers tens of billions of dollars. However, the sav-
ings enjoyed by customers is dependent upon how one measures 
those savings. Notwithstanding that average wholesale gas prices 
have declined substantially over the course of deregulation, that 
decline has come largely in the cost of the gas itself, not in the mar-
gins. Thus, the margins paid to marketers have remained the same, 
and average cost savings are the result of lower well-head prices, 
not competitive forces in the industry (Leitzinger 4 ). 
Because savings on the cost of gas are likely to be small and 
the national market for natural gas is competitive, savings for the 
consumer among various marketers will be minimal because mar-
keters will be purchasing gas at roughly the same prices. The via-
bility of gas marketers has come into question, especially after one 
of the marketers in Georgia, Peachtree Natural Gas, sought bank-
ruptcy protection in mid October 1999 (Quinn). Although S.B. 215 
allows the assignment of customers to other marketers when a mar-
keter cannot supply gas to its customers, this provision of the bill 
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creates uncertainty for consumers and adds to the problems of reli-
ability. Also, some gas utility representatives and state regulators 
question whether gas marketers have contracted for sufficient 
capacity to insure the reliable supply of gas during peak periods. 
Deregulation has prompted some very important questions: 
Whose obligation is it to serve the consumer? The marketer's or 
the carrier's? Also, who is the supplier of last resort? If carriers 
exit merchant sales, how should the assignment of unused pipeline 
capacity be handled (Radford 2)? More specifically, will marketers 
be given space on the pipeline themselves or will carriers allow the 
space to be unused? The question of accountability also comes into 
play. Consumers of gas expect marketers and carriers to be held 
accountable for the product they sell (in whatever role they assume 
as sellers or transporters) by providing a dependable product to the 
end user. 
Similarities Between Gas and Other Industries 
The deregulation of the telecommunications industry can 
provide a useful comparison for the deregulation of the natural gas 
industry. The deregulation of AT&T in the 1980's produced a 
"brave new world" of consumer choice. The choice, however, 
resulted in much confusion. Many consumers of natural gas have 
been confused by the choices. The deregulation of the telecommu-
nications industry was supposed to result in lower telephone rates. 
It did so for high-volume long-distance customers, but the average 
telephone user did not realize any substantial long-term savings. 
This situation mirrors what is occurring in the natural gas industry. 
Industrial users are able to purchase natural gas directly from the 
wholesaler (at city gate) in large enough quantities to gain 
economies of scale and realize substantial savings. The average 
low-volume residential user of natural gas does not have the oppor-
tunity to realize such savings. The minimum charges assessed for 
residential and commercial natural gas use mirror the access 
charges required of customers of telephone companies. The tele-
phone industry charges each user a network access fee, and then the 
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consumer pays a per-minute charge for the long-distance calls. The 
access fee bears no relation to the number or duration of long-dis-
tance ( tariff) calls and is thus similar to the minimums being 
charged to natural gas end-users. However, these access fees, as a 
percentage of total charges, do not nearly mirror the amount being 
charged natural gas consumers to recover stranded costs, even 
though the telecommunications companies could have invoked 
similar claims for their need: In the early and middle 1970's, MCI 
and AT&T invested substantial sums in the installation of 
microwave towers, which were rendered nearly valueless by the 
technological advance of fiber optic cable as the FCC deregulated 
the long-distance telephone market. Yet there was no concern for 
the recovery of these stranded costs when the FCC deregulated the 
long-distance market. There are similarities between the deregula-
tion of the natural gas industry and the deregulation of the tele-
phone industry that are centered around the recovery of stranded 
costs; however, the telephone industry has been less aggressive in 
recovering stranded costs of service. Carriers of natural gas, on the 
other hand, are using an accelerated approach in the recovery of 
stranded or sunk costs. 
The Implications of the Deregulation 
of the Electric Industry on the Natural Gas Industry 
The Energy Policy Act of 1992 outlined the eventual dereg-
ulation of the nation's electric industry. Because the production of 
electric energy involves the use of substantial quantities of natural 
gas, an in-depth look at what is occurring and about to occur will 
reveal the impact deregulation of the electric industry will have on 
natural gas. 
As deregulation takes place in the electric industry, some 
downward pressure on the price of electricity will inevitably occur, 
thus increasing the use of electricity. As more electricity is 
demanded, the increased use of fuels such as natural gas to produce 
electricity may cause the price of gas to go up: 
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. . . there are going to be even greater incentives for the 
electricity, natural gas, and liquid markets to move closer 
together. This joining of energy markets will occur due to 
the interdependency of each fuel. An integrated market is 
one where sellers offer all kinds of energy services and 
where different forms of energy can be exchanged physi-
cally or financially. (Toal 14) 
As the natural gas and electricity markets become further 
entwined, consumers will have a challenge in deciding what ener-
gy product to choose for their individual needs. Energy superstores 
are being planned for many consumption markets. These super-
stores will provide "one-stop" shopping for the energy consumer, 
who will thus be able to purchase electricity, natural gas, propane, 
and fuel oil from one retailer. The benefit of such a system for the 
average consumer is not certain. Trying to be all things to all peo-
ple sometimes has dire consequences for service and reliability. 
The structures of the electric industry and the gas industry 
are very different. For one thing, there is more vertical integration 
within the electricity industry. Facilities of transmission and distri-
bution are owned by the company also supplying the power. In the 
gas industry, gas distributors have always been separate from the 
gas producers (Gas IRP Review). This structural differential will 
require further "unbundling" of services in the electric industry. 
According to Fay, however, "whatever innovations occur on the 
electric side, in the full competition case they have an echo on the 
gas side. In that sense, the fate of the two industries may be more 
linked than commonly anticipated" (5). 
Electric deregulation will also affect the cost of electricity I 
for oil and gas producers. The cost of electricity for oil producers, 
for example, can be as much as two-thirds of production costs or 
about $10 per barrel of oil. Gas and oil producers are thus con-
cerned over how electricity rates will rise or fall in a deregulated 
marketplace (Whitcomb 2 ). The two industries often vie for the 




The deregulation of the electric industry will be very simi-
lar to that of the natural gas industry. Both industries have strand-
ed costs and have similar distribution structures. The only differ-
ences lie in the methods by which each industry delivers the final 
product to the consumer. Although one must consider the very dif-
ferent production sides of these two industries, major similarities 
can be found in how energy is distributed by both. The electric 
transmission system is like a pool of power with producers pouring 
power in and users drawing it out. This situation is very similar to 
that of the gas industry in that marketers must provide a pool of gas 
for distribution across the carriers' pipelines. Consequently, the 
deregulation of the electric industry is expected to follow the 
process now occurring in the gas industry very closely. Until the 
electric industry is fully deregulated, however, the effects of elec-
tric deregulation on the overall energy market will be unknown. As 
the electric industry is deregulated, more and more gas and elec..'. 
tricity marketers are expected to join forces to satisfy consumer 
demand for energy. 
The Effect of Natural Gas Deregulation on Other Energy Providers 
Fuel oil and propane are the two other major energy sources 
currently being affected by the deregulation of natural gas. 
Although these two energy markets are fully deregulated and com-
petitive, natural gas deregulation has created a contradictory situa-
tion for these two energy markets. On the one hand, there are 
opportunities arising from disgruntled customers of natural gas 
switching to one of these two fuels because of the monthly mini-
mums charged by natural gas utilities to recover stranded costs. 
Thus, natural gas deregulation is increasing the customer base in 
these two markets. On the other hand, propane and fuel oil mar-
keters are increasingly finding themselves in competition with 
energy super-stores, a residual effect of deregulation. Further, nat-
ural gas marketers are offering customers non,-gas services such as 
free carbon monoxide detectors and the option of buying electrici-
ty and fuels such as propane and fuel oil at reduced rates (GAO 
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Report 19). The deregulatory process is thus providing opportuni-
ties as well as challenges for other energy providers: 
At first glance, combined utilities seem to be in a good posi-
tion because they can provide both gas and electricity. 
Notwithstanding this, customers want hot water or space 
heating. They don't really care whether they buy electrons 
or molecules of natural gas. Customers desire energy at the 
lowest price, delivered when they need it, with the least 
amount of effort on their part. (ORI Report 3) 
With integrated energy solutions as the wave of the future, 
energy providers concentrating on only one energy offering may 
find themselves experiencing limited market growth in the near 
future. However, the actions taken by marketers who advantage 
themselves in the chaos created by deregulation call for some ethi-
cal evaluation. As Tom Peters relates in Thriving on Chaos, com-
panies of the future will need to take advantage of the chaos creat-
ed by market dynamics by becoming more flexible and creative in 
satisfying the immediate needs of the consumer. Thus, as energy 
superstores become more prevalent, energy suppliers will not be 
able to offer only one energy product. In order to survive in the 
energy market of the future, energy suppliers will have to offer a 
broad array of energy products that satisfy individual needs within 
certain niche markets (48). 
In the final analysis, should marketers who provide propane 
and fuel oil attempt to capture the natural gas market or better posi-
tion themselves for the future by being providers of energy, no mat-
ter what its form? This question may not be answered until the 
deregulation of natural gas and electricity have gone through the 
full process and customers have been provided ample opportunity 
to express their energy needs. 
The Utilitarian Argument 
A utilitarian defense of natural gas deregulation argues that 
the present deregulatory process is good because the greatest good 
for the greatest number of energy consumers will result from it. 
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Marcus, however, notes a general objection to the utilitarian view: 
"Utilitarianism aims to maximize happiness, but in paying attention 
to happiness in general, it can ignore individual happiness. What 
happens to the rights of minorities when the majority decides what 
the greatest good for the greatest number is?" (174) Thus, a ques-
tion arises: Is it ethical for the indirect effects of the deregulatory 
process to take advantage of consumers who must pay for stranded 
costs, while high volume users, such as industrial consumers of gas, 
reap the benefit of lower prices? Schmidt's observations on the 
results of deregulation show how the utilitarian principle fails to 
consider the needs of all individuals: "results support the views of 
the critics of deregulation in the short run, because households, 
especially low income households, seem to be worse off under 
deregulation in the first two years" (1). 
In this process of deregulation, the recovery of stranded 
costs is disproportionately being shouldered by average consumers 
of natural gas, especially those with low incomes. The proponents 
of deregulation have argued that deregulation results in general 
benefits. Customer choice and better prices are supposed to appear 
as new competitors enter the industry. In this scenario, prices are 
supposed to decrease and innovation is supposed to increase. 
Consequently, competition in the gas industry is given credit for 
reducing prices and producing savings of some $50 billion. 
However, one wonders who within the gas consumer base has real-
ized the major portion of these savings. 
Another view bolstering the utilitarian argument develops 
from an economic theory viewing the emergence of a natural 
monopoly as justification for deregulation. According to this theo-
ry, the natural monopoly realizes falling average costs as it increas-
es output. Thus, this firm can produce more cheaply than any other 
of a number of firms. It can be argued, however, that under such 
circumstances competition is eventually eliminated and that con-
sumers are thus worse off. Regulation, on the other hand, can keep 
competition alive. The goal of regulation, in general, should be to 
force the economy to work more efficiently in order to maximize 
the wealth of its citizens. 
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In Georgia, concerns have arisen over what will happen to 
the elderly poor as the deregulatory process comes to a conclusion. 
Several agencies are concerned about the continuation of a low-
income senior citizen discount of about $9 per month, which has 
been extended to about 30,000 senior gas customers statewide. 
AGL, the dominant retailer in Georgia at the time the discounts 
were allowed, had proposed dropping the discounts in 1996; how-
ever, the Public Service Commission of Georgia ordered the carri-
er to continue the discounts. Nevertheless, as deregulation is fully 
implemented: individual marketers will be free to continue or dis-
continue the discounts (GAO Report 8). 
Thus, it is evident that drastic changes will take place as 
deregulation is fully completed. Many consumers who were bene-
ficiaries of private assistance programs in a regulated natural gas 
market will now be faced with the open market realities of full 
competition and market fragmentation. Natural gas deregulation as 
envisioned by regulatory authorities is intended to provide long-
term lower costs for consumers who choose this form of energy. 
However, customers in Georgia are experiencing higher bills from 
the recovery of stranded costs by the carriers of natural gas. Until 
the stranded cost issue is solved, the utilitarian argument for natu-
ral gas deregulation will not be valid. 
Shareholder vs. Stakeholder Debate 
As the natural gas industry is deregulated, there is continu-
ing debate about the residual effects of the process and the recipi-
ents of its benefits. As natural gas carriers downsize and decrease 
operating costs, shareholders of these carriers are anticipating 
increased shareholder value. On the other hand, stakeholders such 
as customers, employees, and others who are directly dependent 
upon the industry are experiencing something far different 
from"added value" to their consumption portfolios: employees are 
losing jobs, and customers with higher overall gas bills have less 
disposable income. In the cases of both the natural gas industry and 
the telecommunication industry, we can look to the analogy of the 
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"three-legged stool" for a balanced view of the interests of both 
shareholders and stockholders. As Brooke relates, 
The three-legged stool embraced the belief that the mission 
for AT&T's leadership was to balance the interests of each 
of the company's major constituents: shareholders, with 
stock growth and dividends attractive enough to bring in 
new capital; customers, with "universal service" in an 
affordable local and long-distance pricing structure; and 
employees, with suitable wages, benefits, and career oppor-
tunities to attract competence. A balanced stool with strong 
leg, . . . would serve the company and the nation best. 
(Brooke 1) 
This analogy seemed to provide a model for a balanced 
approach toward achieving corporate gains. However, as deregula-
tion was implemented in the telecommunication industry, the three-
legged stool was transformed into a one-legged stool designed to 
maximize financial performance (Tunstall 40). We find this reduc-
tion of "stool legs" occurring in the deregulated natural gas indus-
try, too. Conversely, with a fragmented energy market becoming 
the norm in our country, many traditional "full service" energy 
providers are finding that more must be done with less, with con-
sequent negative effects on the quality of service provided to the 
consumers of natural gas, who are justifiably the most important 
stakeholders. 
Inevitably, worries about adequate supplies of fuel arise 
because many marketers will refrain from making capital expendi-
tures on gas supplies and purchase gas on the spot market. Bowers 
therefore asks, "in a cold winter are the alternative suppliers going 
to be able to perform and supply gas when it's needed?" (44) The 
shareholders of natural gas companies view value as an increase in 
investment holdings over time, while the stakeholders of natural 
gas companies view value as having a secure workplace (employ-
ees) or receiving a reliable and workable energy supply (cus-
tomers). As these opposing interests are debated in the deregulato-
ry environment, one must be concerned with what will happen to 
those who cannot readily, for whatever reason, choose another 
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energy source. These customers will be held captive to the results 
of deregulation. We will have to let the process "run its course" 
before we learn what the results will ultimately be. 
Recommendations 
The stranded cost recovery issue seems to be the most dif-
ficult problem in deregulation of the natural gas industry. Since the 
average gas user in Georgia is shouldering a large share of the 
unbundling process in the form of high minimum payments, natu-
ral gas carriers, such as AGL, should make these minimums more 
affordable to the average consumer. As mentioned earlier, charging 
a reasonable additional amount per thermal unit of gas over a 
longer period of time would be more equitable than the present sys-
tem of very high minimum usage charges. 
To improve reliability, marketers should be required to pur-
chase a certain percentage of their gas well ahead of peak usage 
periods to help reduce possible price spikes that normally occur 
during peak usage periods. This requirement would also increase 
consumer confidence in each individual marketer's ability to pro-
vide continuous service. 
Better education for gas consumers on the overall deregula-
tion process would help alleviate some of the confusion. Aware of 
the confusion in the earlier deregulation of the telecommunication 
industry, marketers of natural gas should not make the process any 
more complicated than it inherently is and should keep the con-
sumer well informed as the deregulatory process proceeds. 
Marketers should use patience when soliciting new customers. 
Offering gas rate packages that are deceptive in regard to raw prices 
will only fuel the potential customer's overall disdain for deregula-
tion. 
In general, taking a much slower approach to recovering 
investments made long ago by natural gas carriers will be benefi-




Deregulation should enhance value for the natural gas 
industry. However, value for some may mean just more economi-
cal prices for gas, while value for others may mean a safe and reli-
able energy source at a reasonable price. As the competitive envi-
ronment within the natural gas industry develops, some may see 
value as a monetary objective while others may see value as some-
thing more complex and intrinsic. As the markets within the indus-
try become more flexible, it would be short-sighted and derelict for 
marketers and carriers to lose sight of what ultimately needs to be 
accomplished in a fair and just manner. Those who complacently 
take advantage of customers will lose market share to other energy 
providers and inevitably transform the deregulatory process into 
something vastly different from what it was conceived to be. 
The eighteenth-century German philosopher Immanuel 
Kant could give the natural gas industry an important ethical 
maxim: "every rational being exists as end in himself and not 
merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will ... " 
(qtd. in Marcus 163). Accordingly, the deregulation of America's 
natural gas industry should be conducted in a manner whereby the 
interests of all consumers are served in an equitable and just man-
ner. 
35 
The Corinthian: The Journal of Student Research at GC&SU 
Works Cited 
Bowers, Carol L. "State Regulators Forge Their Own Paths." 
Utility Business 10 Oct. 1999: 43-48. 
Fay, James M. Scenarios of Re,structuring in the U.S. Power 
Industry: Implications for Natural Gas. Cambridge, MA: 
Cambridge Energy Research Associates, 1996. 
Government Accounting Office Report. Energy Deregulation: 
Status of Natural Gas Customer Choice Programs. 
GAO/RCED-99-30. Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1998. 
Gas IRP Review. Focus on Issues Jan./Feb. 1996. 
Georgia. Senate. Natural Gas Competition and Deregulation Act. 
SB 215 97, 1997. 
Higgins, Walter H. "The State of Deregulation in Georgia." 
American Gas July 1999: 6. 
Leitzinger, Jeffrey J. "Gas Experience Can Steer Power Away from 
Deregulation Snags." Oil and Gas Journal 12 Aug. 1996: 
49-52. 
Marcus, Alfred A. Business & Society: Strategy, Ethics, and the 
Global Economy. Chicago: Irwin, 1996. 
Quinn, Matthew C. "Ailing Gas Firm Gets Temporary Relief." 
Atlanta Journal Constitution 30 Oct. 1999: C 1. 
Radford, Bruce W. "Blowing Right By." Public Utilities 
Fortnightly 1 Feb. 1998: 4-8. 
Schmidt, Ronald H. "Effects of Natural Gas Deregulation on the 
Distribution of Income." Economic Review May 1983: 1-
12. 
Toal, Brian A. "Impact of Electricity Deregulation on Gas Could Be 
Enormous." Oil & Gas Investor July 1995: 14-16. 
Tunstall, W. Brooke. "The Downsizing of AT&T: Is There a Better 
Way?" Telecommunications May 1996: 40-42. 
Whitcomb, Paulette. "Fishing in the BTU River." Oil & Gas 
Investor May 1997: 22-35. 
36 
